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Abstract. The last three decades have witnessed a proliferation of 
studies on the globalization of corruption or convergence of anti-
corruption strategies. These studies have been motivated by scholarly 
concerns from various administrative, economic, and political fields. In 
view of these interdisciplinary concerns, the purpose of this article is to 
provide a comparative analysis of corruption phenomena and the demand 
for public integrity because these developments pertain to the discourse on 
globalization issues in some South-Eastern European nations within the 
last decade. The article concludes that the differences observed in these 
countries are due to their level of maturation in the democratic processes, 
their stages in the European Union integration process, and the 
geopolitical condition of each nation, and offers a palatable public policy 
prescription for achieving a lasting impact in the region. 
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In several analyses and scholarly discourse, topics such as corruption and 
public integrity have been approached in the general context of globalization. 
In fact, the “globalization of corruption” as chronicled by scholars (Glynn et al. 
1997, Matei, Matei, 2008, Eigen, 2002) and its effects on the evolution of 
corruption are integrated into the most relevant studies on globalization 
(Stiglitz, 2002, Sen, 2000, Jain, 2001, Otusanya, 2011). These scholars have 
identified a “corruption eruption,” whose causes are multi-faceted and 
politically transformed due to popular social movements induced by liberal 
political economic forces. 
For the South-Eastern European countries, the fall of Berlin Wall and the 
end of Cold War have not only propelled but skyrocketed the processes of 
globalization and, of course, corruption. Some researchers tend not to discuss 
the connection between corruption and globalization since the latter is acting 
more on the practices of corruption, enlargement of corruption market, and its 
harmonization at regional level. The presumption is that globalization has 
effects on the development of the strategies for public integrity, and the general 
framework provided by each nation’s integrity systems.  
The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of 
corruption phenomena and the demand for public integrity as these 
developments relate to the debate on globalization issues in some South-
Eastern European nations within the last decade. The general framework of the 
comparative analysis comprises the following: 1) an evaluation of the national 
anti-corruption strategies and their impact on the level of social perception of 
corruption; and 2) mechanisms and instruments used in evaluating corruption, 
public integrity, and globalization by the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, and KOF Index of Globalization. 
In terms of research methodology, the evaluation of anti-corruption 
strategies is based on Steves-Rousso dynamic model, developed by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and improved by the 
authors. The target group comprises three European Union member states such 
as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, and an acceding country like Croatia, and 
Serbia, a nation that has a good potential of reaching a candidate status soon—
these two states belonged to the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslav 
Federation, respectively. 
The analysis begins with a review of relevant literature focusing on 
globalization of corruption and public sector reform measures. This is followed 
by a discussion of the research methodology that utilizes anti-corruption 
strategies as instrument of public integrity, and the study results as these pertain 
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to the purpose of our analysis. The article concludes that corruption, public 
integrity, and globalization trends are different in the South-Eastern European 
countries examined due to their level of maturation in the democratic processes, 
their stages in the European Union integration process, and the geopolitical 
specificity of each nation. 
 
Review of relevant literature 
 
The end of the Cold War has induced a twofold level of globalization and 
corruption as a new phenomenon, “global corruption epidemic” or “corruption 
eruption” that “can be attributed to the emergence of civil societies and the 
disclosure of corruption in many countries and the trend towards democracy 
and markets, which has paradoxically increased both the opportunities for graft 
and the likelihood of exposure” (Leiken, 1996, p. 58, Quah, 2002, p. 454). 
According to Glynn et al. (1997), the emergence of corruption as a global issue 
is identified in the last decade of the 20th century due to the following causes: 
1) systemic political changes in some regions have negatively affected the 
social, political and legal institutions, thus opening the way for new abuses; and 
2) political and economic liberalisation have jointly uncovered corruption that 
was previously concealed. 
Some scholars not only “observe a marked decrease in the willingness of 
the public to tolerate corrupt practices by their political leaders and economic 
elites” (Glynn et al., 1997, p. 8), but they also discover an intrinsic link 
between eruption of corruption and the economic crisis, a phenomenon that has 
become a leitmotif of politics at global level in the last decade. Other plausible 
causes of globalization of corruption include changes that paved the way for 
governmental openness and democracy in the most repressive states, and the 
increase of information consumption and technological exchanges, thus placing 
knowledge as a major resource of corruption. 
At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the increase in economic 
interdependence have contributed to the perception that the corruption 
phenomena are more spread and have ramifications inherently at global level. 
Both Quah (2002) and Farazmand (1999) provide arguments for sustaining the 
idea of globalization of corruption. Quah contends that between 1993 and 1997, 
“corruption was transformed from a predominantly national or regional 
preoccupation to an issue of global revolutionary force” (Quah, 2002, p. 455), 
thus calling for anti-corruption actions and strategic plans from international 
organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, Organization of 
American States, International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency 
International, and the World Economic Forum, to mention but a few. 
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Conversely, Farazmand (1999) argues that globalization not only encourages 
privatization programs as reform measures, but it also empowers a few selected 
elites as agents of multinational corporations, and accelerates corruption in both 
developed and underdeveloped countries. Nonetheless, he opined that it 
challenges the conscience of the public administration community to “question 
the sincerity of the elites, oppose exploitation, and resist being used for unde-
mocratic, unjust, and inequitable purposes around the globe” (1999, p. 519).  
 
Theories of public sector reform and corruption 
 
Matei and Matei (2008) have grappled with the concept of globalization 
of corruption by taking into consideration the causes that determine this 
process, which is derived from the public sector reforms. Using empirical 
models, they show the endemic characteristics of various regions concerning 
the relationships between democracy and corruption, starting with “buying the 
votes and political influence or even control by political power” (Matei, Matei, 
2008, p. 9).  
Based on Matei and Matei’s conceptualization, the public sector reform 
has become an issue on the governmental agenda in various jurisdictions. We 
find these preoccupations both in the developed and developing countries. For 
the first category, an eloquent image of those preoccupations is provided 
through the studies done by OECD Public Management Service and published 
in 1995, which concluded that the key focus of any stratergic reform should be 
on “performance-oriented and … customer-oriented public administration” 
(OECD, 1995, p. 17).  
Obviously the implementation of this principle is characterised as 
globalization and taken as a part of the reform strategies being pursued by 
public sectors in the developing countries. Another interesting perspective, as it 
pertains to this study, is provided by Stiglitz (2003) in his thought provocative 
book, Globalization and its Discontents, where he echoed the negative effects 
of globalization on developing countries and their less-privileged citizens due 
to the corruption phenomena. Public policy issues at stake here include, but are 
not limited to, fiscal austerity, foreign investments, capitalistic-induced 
mechanisms, privatization of government assets, and the liberalization of 
capital markets. 
Concerning the relationships between market, state and social 
opportunity, Sen (2000) presents the provision of social services as well as 
incentives by emphasizing a series of possible distortions due to information 
asymmetry, which not only raises the administrative costs for countries, but it 
leads to substantial losses, and consequently to corruption. While the term 
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corruption is not easily definable (Jain, 2001, Johnston, 1996, Schmidt, 2007), 
Sen (2000) describes it as a power asymmetry whereby civil servants or public 
officials have the authority to grant benefits for which the beneficiaries are 
compelled to furnish a bribe for services rendered, consequently paving the 
way for more corruption. He further presents a more profound approach 
concerning the ethical values and policymaking, by suggesting that a sound 
public policy has to be focused on justice, and all public policies should be 
designed to control individual and group behaviours as long as they adhere to 
proper social ethics. 
The perspective of social ethics and its relationship with corruption in the 
public sector provide to Sen the opportunity to extend his analysis on the 
causes and consequences of corruption. “Dominance of corruption,” as defined 
by Sen, is really seen as one of the greatest obstacles for economic progress. In 
view of this, any increase in the level of corruption may have negative effects 
on the effectiveness of public policies (Sen, 2000, p. 171). Specifically, a series 
of attitudes are identified through which some legislative regimes encourage 
corruption by providing discretionary power to the civil servant, who may 
award favours, representing a large amount of money. 
In fact, some scholars have discovered that the temptation to corruption is 
greater when public officials hold more power or stay in office for a longer haul 
(Ferraz, Finan, 2009, Fredriksson, Svensson, 2003). Campante et al. (2009,  
p. 43) developed their analysis using a framework that takes into consideration 
political stability and corruption by emphasising the following two effects:  
1) horizon effect, which posits that greater instability leads to higher corruption 
for those holding power, by taking advantage of this short opportunity; and  
2) demand effect, which proposes that the private sector is more eager to bribe 
politicians who are politically more stable due to their power of incumbency. 
Revisiting Sen’s (2000) study, he associates the power holding status of 
civil servants with the material situation, relatively modest, leading to an 
increase in corruption temptation. This occurs at the lowest level of an 
organization hierarchy and this is why corruption triumphs in most democratic 
systems, involving mid-career and top bureaucratic officials. This brings to 
bear the continuous demand for the prevention and fight against corruption. 
Since the obvious motivation for corruption is to accumulate profit, its 
eradication is very problematic. 
Potential causes of corruption have been explored in various ways 
through public choice and black apple theories. In the case of public choice 
theory, an individual is seen as a rational actor, who continually engages in a 
cost-benefit calculation before deciding to be corrupt whenever the benefits 
outweigh the costs of getting in trouble (Klitgaard, 1988). Conversely, the 
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black apple theory posits that a person with faulty moral values, using the bad 
apple metaphor, is likely to engage in a corrupt act. The idea here is that there 
is a correlation between “a defective human character and a predisposition 
toward criminal activity” (Otusanya, 2011, p. 393, Punch, 2000).        
The literature is replete with efficient mechanisms for institutional 
reforms, systems for controlling corruption as well as sanctions against its 
proliferation (Andvig, 2006, Johnston, 2005, Punch, 2000, Treisman, 2000, 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Gary, Kaufmann, 1998, Vogel, 1998, Heidenheimer, 
1996, Kaufmann, Siegelbaum, 1997, Klitgaard, 1988). However, their coverage 
area is relatively limited despite the fact that some studies examined cross-
national problems. The most complex mechanism for assessing public integrity 
is known as the bird’s nest. According to Sampford, Smith, and Brown (2005, 
p. 96), the bird’s nest metaphor suggests that “a multitude of often weak 
institutions and relationships can combine to more effectively protect and 
promote the fragile goal of public integrity.” In his study, for instance, Bruno 
(1996) discussed the example provided by Kantilya, an Indian political analyst 
during the 4th century, who described forty different ways in which a civil 
servant may be tempted to become corrupt from the financial point of view and 
explained how a cash payment system, followed by sanctions and rewards, can 
prevent those activities (Bruno, 1996, pp. 7-8). These arguments together with 
other assertions furnish the support for the promotion of national as well as 
supranational strategies for the fight against corruption in order to ensure public 
integrity in public management.  
 
Profile of corruption in South-Eastern European nations 
 
In addition to the arguments observed in the existant literature, we may 
add reports from important establishments such as the World Bank and 
Transparency International (TI). The 2010 TI report concluded that the areas 
and institutions most affected by corruption remain the political parties, 
parliaments, police and judiciary. Without elaborating on the TI’s 
methodological details here, this observation seems problematic because, 
within the last few years, political parties and parliaments have remained the 
main actors perceived to be the most corrupt. A comparison between the world 
level and that of South-Eastern European countries reveals some increases in 
the magnitude of indicators for quasi majority of the sectors and/or institutions, 
varying between 0.2 for media, reaching 1.0 for the medical services, 0.8 for 
education services or registry and permit. Romanian records for 2006, as a 
country in South-Eastern Europe, show lower values than the regional average, 
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except for the political parties, where it exceeds the regional level by 0.1 
(Matei, Matei, 2007, p. 11, Transparency International, 2006).  
Although the aforementioned indicators are based on third-part 
perceptions of corruption, they still show respondents’ negative perception of 
the effects of government actions or fight against corruption. The TI reports of 
the South-Eastern European region show that only 27% of the population 
acknowledge government actions to control corruption to be either effective or 
very effective, while 9% think these actions promote corruption. In Romania, 
for example, where 16% of the respondents support the effectiveness of 
government actions against corruption, only 11% indicate that those actions 
tend to have negative recursive effects on corruption (Matei, Matei, 2007,  
p. 11, Transparency International, 2006). In its 2010 annual report, Transparency 
International (TI) acknowledged that political corruption can be remedied when 
citizens demand integrity and accountability from their leaders. The obvious 
reason being that through strong commitments to anti-corruption, public 
officials “can improve trust in political institutions and processes” (2010, p. 9). 
The institutionalization of bribery of any kind does affect national productivity 
and civic engagement. Similarly, any form of embezzlement diminishes the real 
allowances for public services, health and education. In all countries examined 
by TI, the corruption phenomenon greatly affects people’s life. Generally, TI 
report underscores the fact that political parties are extensively involved in the 
corruption equation and global efforts to strengthen anti-corruption awareness 




The previous studies have revealed multiple instruments and mechanisms 
designed to promote and sustain public integrity. As pointed out by Matei and 
Matei in their 2007 study, the binom “corruption-public integrity” is inversely 
and proportionally interrelated. They acknowledge that despite data collection 
problems, the National Integrity Systems (NIS) is one of the best complex 
mechanisms for assessing public integrity. Introduced by Transparency 
International about a decade and a half ago, NIS provides a global overview of 
public integrity at national level, emphasizing the role of various pillars, actors, 
mechanisms, among others. The support of NIS operation is furnished by the 
national anti-corruption strategies, whose assessment imposes an important 
effort data collection, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information. 
Matei and Matei (2011) identify multiple models used by previous studies in 
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assessing the anti-corruption strategies, which are deployed by others (Andrei, 
et al., 2009) using models developed by the World Bank (Huther, Shah, 2000), 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Steves, Rousso, 
2003). In this study, we are going to deploy what we call Steves-Rousso-
Matei’s dynamic model to assess the anti-corruption strategies in two stages.  
 
Stage 1: Static anti-corruption matrix 
The study done by Steves and Roussos (2003) pertains to the former 
communist nations in transition from 1999 to 2002. In terms of operatio-
nalization, each matrix has a single value for the whole period of time, and this 
is why this technique is a static procedure. As a result, the Steves and Rousso 
(2003) model is based on the static anti-corruption matrix (Appendix 1), where 
the evaluated anti-corruption activities are divided in three general categories as 
follows: 
1) Omnibus reform programs; 
2) New legislation targeted at anti-corruption; and 
3) Accession to international conventions and membership in interna-
tional anti-corruption coalitions.  
In each category, Steves and Rousso developed a grading system that 
represents the basis of the calculation for an index specific for each group: 
Omnibus Index (OI), Legal Index (LI) and Conventions Index (CI). Similarly, 
each category was divided into various distinct criteria based on specific 
activities in every country. Thus, for the activities specific to OI, an evaluation 
plan is suggested and defined as follows: 
OI.1 The design and publication of an anti-corruption strategy;  
OI.2 The development of an implementation plan for anti-corruption 
action; and 
OI.3 The establishment of a national anti-corruption commission, 
ombudsman, or a similar authority aimed at coordinating and monitoring the 
achievement of objectives and activities from the national anti-corruption 
strategy. 
Furthermore, each criterion in the matrix was coded “1” and used to 
represent the introduction of anti-corruption measures, while “0” was coded to 
denote the contrary. As presented in Appendix 1, these three major components 
of the OI are weighted equally. Steves and Rousso (2003) considered not only a 
formal consignment of the activities mentioned but also some aspects concer-
ning their design, content, and operationalization. Thus, for each criterion, there 
are sub-criteria as delineated in Appendix 1. They refer mainly to: 
1) The involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 
developing anti-corruption activities; 
Corruption, public integrity, and globalization in South-Eastern European states 
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2) The complex structure of the strategy comprising several 
governmental branches or ministries such as that of justice, 
administration and home affairs, etc., and 
3) The formal independence of anti-corruption commission or authority 
before the government. 
Moreover, for the activities specific to LI (i.e., a new anti-corruption 
legislation), six criteria were designed to account for legislative amendments or 
implementation of six applicable laws selected on the basis of a careful 
observation of the specificity of the regulatory framework in the countries 
under review. Regarding CI, it assesses the nations’ commitments to ratify and 
abide by international conventions and standards, and their participation in 
global organizations and alliances. 
In order to fine-tune this index, 1/3 was allotted for signing the 
instrument, 2/3 for signing and ratifying, and “1” if the document has been 
approved, ratified, and under implementation. An A functional index is attained 
through the aggregation of the three indicators to produce an Intensity Index for 
Anti-Corruption (II-AC), which facilitates an appropriate assessment of the 
impact of anti-corruption strategies in each nation, in order to make 
comparisons and correlations with adjacent processes and phenomena, 
specifically for the selected South-Eastern countries. 
In our view, the anti-corruption strategies and all other measures 
associated with them are the reason for designing this technique in concert with 
other procedures describing public sector reforms in transitional countries. 
Matei and Matei (2011) have indicated that the institutionalization of new 
social rules in public institutions and their implementation as delineated in the 
anti-corruption strategies demand a longer timeframe because of the logistics 
involved in its development. In view of this, our new model is designed to 
capture a longer timeframe (10 years, for example) because the quantitative 
assessment of the anti-corruption actions tends to vary. 
 
Stage 2: Dynamic matrix of anti-corruption activities ([A-C]) 
In reference to the discussion in stage 1, our dynamic matrix model has 
the following variable annual quantifiable characteristics: 
 A series of Intensity Indices  ([II-AC]) – OI.1.1, OI.2.1, OI.3.1, OI.3.4 
– as well as CI1-6 are quasi-constant during the period under review; 
they may vary only when the activities quantified are amended, 
modified or replaced with new ones. In this situation, it is a valid 
principle for overlapping the effects. 
 The other II-AC varies annually in a linear way, from the year when 
they were adopted or integrated into the national legislation as an 
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institutional framework. Their values are cumulative and take into 
consideration some eventual amendments, changes or replacements; it 
is also a valid principle for overlapping the effects. 
 The dynamic matrix has the same structure as the one developed by 
Steves and Rousso (2003), and the weights (w) of each II-AC are similar. 
Operationally, the matrix [A-C] will be constructed as follows: 
1) A column will be assigned to each II-AC in [A-C];  
2) A number of rows equal to the number of years (n) during the period 
examined will be assigned to each country under review; 
3) On the analysis of the anti-corruption activities in each nation during 
the period examined, a nominal support matrix will be designed, with 
the same structure as [A-C], marking, for every II-AC, the relevant 
data for the year of adopting, setting up and/or achieving the activities 
aimed by II-AC and the year of their changing, completing, and/or 
restructuring (if applicable). Consequently, every II-AC will have 
temporal data (years), n1 < n2 < …nk which will determine k periods, pi, 
when the activity corresponding to II-AC is stable (pi = n – ni, i = 1, 2, 
… k). 
4) Moreover, numerical values will be allocated annually to every II-AC 
and every nation as follows: 
Regarding quasi-constant indices, for every state and every year during a 
period pi, a part wi from the weight (w) will be awarded, corresponding to  
II-AC, wi = w/k.  For the periods overlapping, the numbers wi will be totalled, 
and 0 percentage will be allocated to the years belonging to no period. 
Concerning the variable linear indices, the allocation will be also annually-
based and specific to every period. Nonetheless, different from quasi-constant 
“II-AC”, every period pi, and every year, ni, the allocation will be as follows: 
 1 ijiij nnn
w
w .  
As in the previous case, for the overlapping periods, the numbers wi will 
be totalled, and 0 percentage will be assigned to the years pertaining to no 
period. In view of this, every II-AC will have increasing allocations, 
overlapped in concert with the periods of amending or updating the legislation, 
strategies, etc. In the example delineated below, the explanation on how the 
matrix [A-C] was obtained will be provided. It is pertinent to note here that the  
matrix [A-C] depends on the period of analysis and, as a result, the values of  
II-AC are usually increasing annually depending on the implementation strategies, 
action plans, domestic and international anti-corruption measures or actions. 
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Results and discussion 
 
The results presented below illustrate the utility for using the dynamic 
anti-corruption matrix. Again, the selected states in this analysis consists of 
three European member states: Bulgaria (BG), Romania (RO) and Slovenia 
(SI)) – an acceding state, Croatia (HR), and Serbia (SE). The period analysed is 
1999-2008. Appendix 2 presents the nominal support matrix used in developing 
anti-corruption activities [A-C] in the states under review in this study (Matei, 
Matei, 2010).  Appendix 3 presents the effective calculation of II-AC as well as 
the primary indices – OI, LI, and CI. It is pertinent to note here that the 
variables associated with the primary indices and the composite index (II-AC) 
has increasing values. These highlight the developing character of the processes 
for describing the anti-corruption activities. Since the procedures for the 
achievement and implementation of anti-corruption strategies are different, the 
calculated correlation coefficient between Slovenia (SI) and Croatia (HR) is not 
very impressive. The magnitude of the correlation coefficient revealed here 
may not be surprising because the objectives of European integration of the 
respective states require them to be in compliance with the transnational anti-
corruption frameworks, which is also promoted by the World Bank, and 
OECD. We also examine the effects of enforcing the anti-corruption strategies 
through their correlation with the index of control of corruption (KKM), 
developed by the World Bank. 
The correlation figures presented in Table 1 for 1999-2008 are relevant 
and demonstrate small positive correlations for Bulgaria and Slovenia (BG, 
0.306; SI, 0.375), and high correlations for Croatia and Serbia (HR, 0.663; RO, 
0.801; SE, 0.890). The policy implications of these findings are more profound 
because they may imply that some of the anti-corruption strategies in these 
states may either be re-examined or that there should be a reconceptualization 
of the instrument of analysis (KKM) used by the World Bank. In fact, another 
explanation may be the difficulty of collecting data and information that reflect 




   BG_KKM HR_KKM RO_KKM SE_KKM SI_KKM 
BG_II_AC Pearson Correlation .306 .562 .863(**) .929(**) .201 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .091 .001 .000 .577 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
HR_II_AC Pearson Correlation .385 .663(*) .804(**) .892(**) .093 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .272 .036 .005 .001 .798 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
RO_II_AC Pearson Correlation .348 .602 .801(**) .901(**) .146 
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   BG_KKM HR_KKM RO_KKM SE_KKM SI_KKM 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .065 .005 .000 .688 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
SE_II_AC Pearson Correlation .363 .617 .829(**) .890(**) .120 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .302 .057 .003 .001 .742 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
SI_II_AC Pearson Correlation .340 .487 .848(**) .921(**) .375 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .336 .154 .002 .000 .286 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
At the same time, the quantitative analysis should be accompanied by a 
more refined qualitative analysis in other to account for other processes that are 
influencing the anti-corruption actions such as political stability, rule of law, 
civil society, to mention but a few. To remedy these methodological 
shortcomings, we adopted a new modified model that, in our view, reflects or 
accounts for the realities in South-Eastern European states, which could 
represent the pillar of objective analysis of the developments in a certain state 
for any comparative discussions. 
 
Assessing the level of globalization in selected South-Eastern states 
 
This analysis uses the KOF Index of Globalization for the quantitative 
assessment of the level of globalization. We refer to the previous studies by 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). Their most relevant analyses pertain to 
the impact of globalization on economic growth. These scholars as well as 
Keohane and Nye (2000) highlight the following dimensions of globalization: 
 Economic globalization, characterised as long distance flows of goods, 
capital and services as well as information and perceptions that 
accompany market exchanges; 
 Political globalization, characterised by a diffusion of government 
policies; 
 Social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, 
images and people (Dreher 2006: 4). 
The previous studies integrate the three variables described above 
through a weighted average as follows: economic globalization (36%), social 
globalization (38%), and political globalization (26%). For the South-Eastern 
European states under review, Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Romania (RO), 
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Characteristics of the globalization process in the states under review 
 
Based on the analysis in Appendix 4, we discover some characteristics of 
different dimensions of globalization, as defined earlier in this section, by 
calculating the mean, respectively, and the standard deviation of variables. 
Table 2 presents the relevant data. 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of globalization in some South-Eastern European states 
State Globalization









BG 67.88 8.28 56.46 3.76 88.01 0.93 68.73 4.46 
HR 65.92 8.87 69.17 1.77 77.72 6.46 70.18 5.47 
RO 58.42 8.68 53.79 2.97 90.30 1.82 64.86 4.57 
SE 57.56 2.49 59.91 4.94 52.94 20.19 57.25 7.53 
SI 72.32 8.44 72.91 2.03 77.02 4.74 73.74 4.99 
Source: authors calculations. 
 
We observed some interesting results for the decade examined (1999 to 
2008). The economic and social dimensions of globalization are comparable in 
all the five states, varying around a mean of 64.42 for the economic dimension 
and 62.45 for the social dimension. Moreover, the processes of economic 
globalization have induced important changes, leading to a significant variation 
of the level of globalization (approximately 8.57), except for Serbia, which has 
a standard deviation of 2.49. Another explanation of this fact can also be seen 
in the processes of economic convergence generated by the policies of 
accession into the European Union. Although the level of economic 
globalization in Serbia is the smallest among the states, it is comparable with 
the other levels, and the transformations during the period indicate minor 
changes as reflected in its low level of standard deviation. 
Regarding the social dimension of globalization, we identify more 
powerful transformations in Serbia (4.94), the other states having a mean 
standard deviation around 2.63. Conversely, on the political dimension of 
globalization, we uncovered three levels.  Bulgaria and Romania (with a mean 
of 89.20) are at the highest level, followed by Slovenia and Croatia (with a 
mean of 77.37) on the second level, and Serbia with a mean of 52.94 on the 
third level. When we further analysed the standard deviations, the same 
hierarchy emerged< this may be due to the membership of the three groups of 
states in different geopolitical areas, being visible is the consequences of 
membership in the former Yugoslavia, and the evolutions of those states after 
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its dissolution. For Serbia, the data indicate major transformations as revealed 
by the high level of the standard deviation of 20.19. 
Apparently, the overall dimension of globalization reflects less significant 
differences because the globalization index represents a weighted mean of the 
other three indices. For all states, the analysis of correlation of the variables 
describing different dimensions of globalization indicates high levels of 
correlation with the political dimension (except Bulgaria). Table 3 presents 
these levels. 
Table 3 
Levels of correlation of the dimensions of globalization 
State Correlation with the political dimension 
Economic Social Overall 
BG 0.596 0.639 0.661 
HR 0.966 0.889 0.982 
RO 0.906 0.883 0.945 
SE 0.731 0.796 0.975 
SI 0.963 0.919 0.979 
Source: authors computations. 
 
The findings concerning a coherence evolution of different dimensions of 
globalization in each of the five states seem very interesting. For example, in 
each dimension, we obtained favourable positive results based on the high 
levels of correlation indices as presented in Table 4. These results compelled us 
to reassess the relationship between globalization and public integrity. 
 
Table 4 
Variation of the correlation indices for different dimensions of globalization 




Economic 0.800 (SE/HR) 0.983 (SI/HR) 
Social 0.836 (HR/RO) 0.982 (BG/SI) 
Political 0.610 (BG/SE) 0.989 (HR/SI) 
Overall 0.910 (BG/HR) 0.993 (HR/SI) 
Source: authors estimations. 
 
Globalization and public integrity 
 
The direct connection between the two processes is more obvious in the 
field literature. As explained at the beginning of this analysis, we shall use the 
quantitative evaluations of the impact of the anti-corruption strategies for 
public integrity. We choose this approach due to the methodological 
similarities in the assessment of the two processes. For clarity purpose, we shall 
explore different correlations of various dimensions of globalization with the 
intensity index of the anti-corruption strategies (II-AC, see Table 5 below). 




Correlation of the dimensions of globalization with the impact  
of the anti-corruption strategies 
State Pearson correlation index with II-AC
Economic Social Political Overall 
BG 0.848 0.993 0.626 0.924 
HR 0.892 0.897 0.950 0.924 
RO 0.870 0.892 0.947 0.918 
SE 0.838 0.920 0.867 0.927 
SI 0.966 0.983 0.972 0.983 
Source: authors calculations. 
 
Consequently, except for Bulgaria, where the correlation index between 
political globalization and the impact of the anti-corruption strategies is lower, 
the other indices are very high, indicating strong correlations. Therefore, a 
linear regression analysis becomes relevant in order to determine the mutual 
influence between these two processes (Table 6). 
 
Table 6  
Coefficients of linear regression 
State Coefficients of linear regression
Constant Standard error Coef.
II-AC 
Standard error 
BG 57.821 1.697 0.197 0.029 
HR 58.126 1.895 0.242 0.035 
RO 55.670 1.536 0.190 0.029 
SE 42.872 2.261 0.316 0.045 
SI 64.365 0.684 0.194 0.013 
Source: authors calculations. 
 
The data from Table 6 reveal that the highest influence of the impact of 
the anti-corruption strategies on the level of globalization could be in Serbia, 
followed by Croatia, and approximately equal in the other states. For example, 
with a certain approximation due to the different standard errors, an increase by 
10% of the impact of the anti-corruption strategies could lead to an increase by 
3% of the level of globalization in Serbia, by 2.4% in Croatia, and 
approximately by 2% in the other states. 
 
Globalization, political stability and corruption 
 
The analysis below is based on the studies done by Campante et al. (2009) 
and the World Bank. Appendix 5 presents the data on the evolution of political 
stability for the period 1999 to 2008. Unlike those presented by the World Bank, 
they are transformed into an interval level measure [0, 100] in order to have the 
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same basis of reference with the other indicators. The calculation of Pearson 
correlation indices leads to the conclusion about different behaviours of the 
variables of globalization and stability for every state. We found the only positive 
Pearson correlations when we explored the variable describing the political 
dimension of globalization and stability. These results are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Correlations between globalization and political stability 
State Pearson correlation indices with political stability 
Economic Social Political Overall 
BG -0.228 -0.423 0.035 -0.288 
HR 0.817 0.743 0.899 0.846 
RO 0.150 0.382 0.489 0.248 
SE 0.699 0.780 0.924 0.915 
SI 0.118 0.116 0.350 0.176 
Source: authors computations. 
 
Table 7 shows that the variable corresponding to political globalization is 
the only indicator that has a positive correlation for all states. From the 
previous positive correlation results presented in Table 5, we assume that 
through a linear regression analysis, direct influences between political 
globalization, stability and impact of the anti-corruption strategies can be 
established. Our regression results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Regression coefficients for political globalization related to political stability and impact 








BG 78.280 6.465 0.134 0.105 0.035 0.013 
HR 43.821 45.692 0.358 0.849 0.256 0.095 
RO 86.443 5.361 0.002 0.103 0.078 0.012 
SE -8.449 13.213 1.935 0.874 0.070 0.352 
SI 35.848 17.758 0.461 0.253 0.176 0.014 
Source: authors computations. 
 
Results presented in Table 8 are very impressive. For example, the most 
powerful influences on political globalization are related to political stability 
(except in Romania). Moreover, the anti-corruption strategies influence, to a 
lesser extent, the processes of political globalization. 
Earlier in the literature section, we referenced the study done by Campante 
et al. (2009) where they developed their analysis using a framework that takes 
into consideration political stability and corruption focusing on two effects: 1) 
horizon effect, which posits that greater instability leads to higher corruption for 
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those holding power, by taking advantage of this short opportunity; and  
2) demand effect, which postulates that the private sector is more eager to bribe 
politicians who are politically more stable due to their power of incumbency. In 
this section of our analysis, the horizon and demand effects were explored with 
an approximate expression using a nonlinear regression through a function of 
power. Table 9 presents the coefficients of that function. 
 
Table 9 
Nonlinear regressions on the relation between political stability and corruption 
State Regression coefficients –
function of power 
State Regression coefficients – 
function of power 
Constant b1 Constant b1 
BG 958.5 - 0,721 SE 0.070 1.665 
HR 8.696 0.483 SI 235.975 -0.284 
RO 69.609 - 0.063  
Source: authors computations. 
 
Although our data did not trigger any relevant conclusion on the 
relationship between political stability and corruption, the effects presented by 
Campante et al. (2009) may be extended to globalization. By analysing the 
variations of the indices of globalization we define their periods of stability and 
periods with higher variations that may be rather identified with the instability 
of the process of globalization. Figures 1a to 1e in Appendix 6 present the 




The purpose of the foregoing analysis has been to provide a comparative 
analysis of corruption phenomena and the demand for public integrity as these 
developments pertain to the discourse on globalization issues in some South-
Eastern European nations within the last decade. Our multifaceted methodology 
allowed us to quantitatively examine these public policy concerns in detail in 
order to reveal precisely both the specificity in every state and the need of 
compatibility between the respective processes. For all the countries, the levels 
of correlation are acceptable and they describe an emergent evolution of policy 
issues in the South-Eastern European region. 
Although we have already summarized our conclusions in the previous 
section, we may add a few highlights. The differences observed in the five 
countries explored in this article are due, in part, to their level of maturation in the 
democratic processes and their stages in the European Union integration process, 
on one hand, and the geopolitical specificity of each country, on the other hand. 
The policy implications of these findings may imply inadequacy of the anti-
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corruption strategies in some states, or an inappropriate perception of corruption 
and, perhaps, it could be that the instrument of analysis deployed by the World 
Bank is not robust enough. In fact, an alternative explanation could be the 
difficulty of gathering data from multifaceted sources that may not reflect actual 
realities in the South-Eastern nations that were examined in this analysis. 
To remedy these methodological limitations, we developed a new 
modified model that depicts, to a certain degree, the realities in South-Eastern 
European countries, which could represent the pillar of objective analysis 
concerning developments in a certain state for any comparative discussions. It 
is also crucial to note here, inter alia, that despite our data transformation 
techniques, the study results could be an artifact of the selected South-Eastern 
countries and the timeline covered, and possibly the variables deployed. 
Despite these methodological concerns, we recommend that future studies 
should not only increase the sample size by including more countries in the 
region, but should consider a longer time period for the implementation reform 
measures to show some effects. 
In sum, while globalization affects developing nations negatively more 
that it impacts advanced countries, corruption is a serious cancer that has 
erupted in all nations due to globalization of assets and capital markets. The 
question is what can be done? We recommend that both governments and 
nongovernmental organizations should play a collective role in stopping 
corruption epidemic at all levels, national, regional, and international, to 
increase global productivity and reduce poverty rate in order to accomplish the 
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal. In terms of a palatable public 
policy prescription, each nation should try to enhance its institutional capacity 
to fight bureaucratic and political corruption of all kinds through prosecution, 
penalties, active anti-prevention measures and public awareness programs. 
While civic engagement is lacking within the private sector and among citizens 
in the South-Eastern nations, higher education institutions in the region should 
be empowered to not only teach an ethics course in their public administration 
or public policy related programs, but also to offer a training course on ethics to 
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Omnibus Index   OI 33.4 Legal Index                              LI 5.55 
National anti-corruption 
strategy                                 
OI1 11.2 Civil Service Law                      LI.1 5.55 
     Adopted OI1.1 5.56 Financial Disclosure Law          LI.2 5.55 
     Involved NGOs                   OI1.2 2.78 Public Procurement Law           LI.3 5.55 
     Multi-branch OI1.3 2.78 Freedom of Information Law     LI.4 5.55 
Anti-corruption action plan      OI2 11.1 Party Finance Law                    LI.5 5.55 
     Adopted OI2.1 5.55 Anti-Money Laundering Law     LI.6 5.55 
     Involved NGOs                   OI2.2 2.78 Conventions Index*                CI 33.3 
     Multi-branch OI2.3 2.78 Stability Pact anti-Corruption 
Initiative                        
CI.1 5.55 
Anti-corruption commission 
or ombudsmen                
OI3 11.1 OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention                               
CI.2 5.55 
     Established OI3.1 5.56 COE GRECO CI.3 5.55 
     Involved NGOs                   OI3.2 1.11 COE Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and  
Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime                    
CI.4 5.55 
     Multi-branch OI3.3 1.11 COE Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption         
CI.5 5.55 
     Independent                       OI3.4 3.33 COE Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption                     
CI.6 5.55 
*In the non-Stability Pact countries, the other five indicators in this Index represent 6.66 
percent of the Intensity Index. 
Source:  Steves and Rousso (2003, p. 6). 
 

























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
BG  1999           x     x x x x    
BG  2000              x      x x x 
BG  2001 x x x        X* X x  x        
BG  2002    x x X x x x x    X*         
BG  2003                       
BG  2004    X* X* X*                 
BG  2005       X* X* X* X*    X* X*        
BG  2006 X* X* X*           X*         
BG  2007           X*     X*       
BG  2008                       
HR 1999                 x      
HR 2000           x        x x x x 
HR 2001       x x x x   x x         
HR 2002 x x x x x X                 
HR 2003             X* X*  x       
HR 2004                       
HR 2005 X* X* X* X* X* X*                 
HR 2006           X*            
HR 2007                       
HR 2008                X*       
RO 1999           x  x  x x   x    
RO 2000                 x   x   
RO 2001 x x x x x X x x x     x       x x 
RO 2002       X* X* X*       X*       
RO 2003               X*        
RO 2004                       
RO 2005 X* X* X* X* X* X* X* X* X*       X*       
RO 2006           X*  X*   X*       
RO 2007                       



























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
RO 2008                       
SE 1999                       
SE 2000                 x   x x x 
SE  2001 x x x x x x x x x x             
SE  2002             x          
SE  2003               x    x    
SE  2004              x         
SE  2005 X* X* X* X* X* X*     x     x       
SE  2006                       
SE  2007                       
SE  2008                       
SI  1999                   x    
SI  2000                       
SI  2001             x  x   x  x x x 
SI  2002           x x  x         
SI  2003                       
SI  2004 x x x x x x x x x x             
SI  2005              X*         
SI  2006             X*          
SI  2007                x       
SI  2008                       
Legend: New attribute, modified or amended X* 
Source: authors estimations. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
BG 1999 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.18 - - - - 0.28 0.46 5.56 5.56 5.56 - - - 16.68 17.14 
BG 2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.36 - - 0.14 - 0.56 1.06 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 34.42 
BG 2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 - - - - - - - 3.06 0.72 0.56 0.56 0.28 0.28 0.84 3.24 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 39.66 
BG 2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.06 0.06 1.66 10.96 1.08 1.11 1.11 0.56 0.56 1.12 5.54 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 49.86 
BG 2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.11 0.11 1.66 11.62 1.44 1.67 1.67 0.84 0.84 1.4 7.86 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 52.84 
BG 2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.17 0.17 1.66 15.36 1.80 2.22 2.22 1.12 1.12 1.68 10.16 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 58.88 
BG 2005 2.78 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.28 0.28 3.33 20.87 2.16 2.78 2.78 1.54 1.40 1.96 12.62 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 66.85 
BG 2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.39 0.39 3.33 24.99 2.52 3.34 3.34 2.10 1.96 2.24 15.50 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 73.85 
BG 2007 5.56 1.24 1.24 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.50 0.50 3.33 26.29 3.06 3.89 3.89 2.66 2.52 2.52 18.54 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 78.14 
BG 2008 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 0.61 0.61 3.33 27.67 3.6 4.45 4.45 3.22 3.08 3.08 21.88 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 82.91 
HR 1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - - - - - 5.56 5.56 
HR 2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.28 0.28 0.56 - 1.40 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 29.20 
HR 2001 - - - - - - 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 9.11 0.56 - 0.56 0.56 1.12 - 2.80 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 39.71 
HR 2002 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 15.45 0.84 - 0.84 0.84 1.68 - 4.2 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 47.45 
HR 2003 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 16.23 1.12 - 1.40 1.40 2.24 0.28 6.44 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 50.47 
HR 2004 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 17.01 1.40 - 1.96 1.96 2.80 0.56 8.68 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 53.49 
HR 2005 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 23.91 1.68 - 2.52 2.52 3.36 0.84 10.92 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 62.63 
HR 2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.66 0.66 3.33 25.25 1.96 - 3.08 3.08 3.92 1.12 13.16 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.21 
HR 2007 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 0.77 0.77 3.33 26.59 2.52 - 3.64 3.64 4.48 1.40 15.68 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 70.07 
HR 2008 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 0.88 0.88 3.33 27.93 3.08 - 4.20 4.20 5.04 1.96 18.48 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 74.21 
RO 1999 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.28 - 0.28 0.14 0.98 - - 5.56 - - - 5.56 6.54 
RO 2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.56 - 0.56 - 0.56 0.28 1.96 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 - - 16.68 18.64 
RO 2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 1.85 0.04 0.04 1.11 9.16 0.84 - 0.84 0.56 0.84 0.42 3.50 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 40.46 
RO 2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 3.70 0.08 0.08 2.22 12.76 1.12 - 1.12 1.12 1.12 0.70 5.18 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 45.68 
RO 2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 3.70 0.16 0.16 2.22 13.48 1.4 - 1.4 1.68 1.68 0.98 7.14 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 48.42 
RO 2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.56 0.56 3.70 0.24 0.24 2.22 14.20 1.68 - 1.68 2.24 2.24 1.26 9.1 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 51.10 
RO 2005 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.32 0.32 3.33 23.45 1.96 - 1.96 2.80 2.80 1.54 11.06 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 62.91 































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
RO 2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.43 0.43 3.33 24.79 2.52 - 2.52 3.36 3.36 1.96 13.72 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.31 
RO 2007 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 0.54 0.54 3.33 26.13 3.08 - 3.08 3.92 3.92 2.52 16.52 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 70.45 
RO 2008 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 0.65 0.65 3.33 27.47 3.64 - 3.64 4.48 4.48 3.08 19.32 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 74.59 
SE  1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SE 2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 22.24 
SE  2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 15.23 - -  - - - - 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 37.47 
SE  2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 16.01 - - 0.56 - - - 0.56 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 38.81 
SE  2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 16.79 - - 1.12 - 0.56 - 1.68 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 46.27 
SE  2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 17.57 - - 1.68 0.56 1.12 - 3.36 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 48.73 
SE  2005 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 24.47 0.56 - 2.24 1.12 1.68 0.56 6.16 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 58.43 
SE  2006 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.66 0.66 3.33 25.81 1.12 - 2.80 1.68 2.24 1.12 8.96 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 65.57 
SE 2007 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.77 0.77 3.33 27.11 1.68 - 3.36 2.24 2.80 1.68 11.76 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.67 
SE 2008 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 0.88 0.88 3.33 28.49 2.24 - 3.92 2.80 3.36 2.24 14.56 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 70.85 
SI  1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - 5.56 - - - 11.12 11.12 
SI  2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - 5.56 - - - 11.12 11.12 
SI  2001 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.56 - 0.84 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 35.04 
SI  2002 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.28 1.12 - 3.08 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 36.44 
SI  2003 - - - - - - - - - - - 1.12 1.12 0.84 0.56 1.68 - 5.32 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 38.68 
SI  2004 5.56 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 21.35 1.68 1.68 1.12 0.84 2.24 - 7.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 62.27 
SI  2005 5.56 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 22.69 2.24 2.24 1.40 1.12 2.80 - 9.80 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 65.85 
SI  2006 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 24.03 2.80 2.80 1.68 1.68 3.36 - 12.32 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 69.71 
SI  2007 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 25.37 3.36 3.36 2.24 2.24 3.92 0.56 15.68 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 74.41 
SI  2008 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 26.71 3.92 3.92 2.80 2.80 4.48 1.12 19.04 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 79.11 
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Appendix 4: Indices of globalization for some South-Eastern European states 
 







































































































































































































































1999 59.27 49.34 86.96 62.63 54.77 65.98 68.05 62.43 47.79 47.36 87.76 57.90 54.20 52.13 23.32 45.47 59.88 70.47 68.89 66.21 
2000 62.71 53.23 87.38 65.46 54.86 68.14 69.18 63.57 50.92 53.10 87.84 61.24 65.42 57.16 25.81 48.83 63.55 69.71 71.03 67.80 
2001 62.29 54.00 87.87 65.73 55.97 67.53 73.10 64.75 50.89 50.95 88.87 60.68 55.99 56.06 29.14 49.10 64.42 72.06 73.47 69.64 
2002 58.95 55.22 88.13 65.04 59.89 68.09 74.35 66.72 51.61 53.92 90.00 62.36 55.88 57.07 50.66 54.98 65.32 71.41 76.10 70.39 
2003 63.18 55.75 88.44 66.86 64.48 68.63 76.66 69.18 53.17 53.83 90.28 62.97 56.32 57.73 65.89 59.31 71.62 71.78 76.88 73.03 
2004 71.02 57.06 87.66 70.01 71.83 70.24 80.40 73.43 61.30 53.91 90.31 65.96 57.44 58.75 67.97 60.64 77.16 74.56 78.75 76.58 
2005 65.79 58.48 86.94 68.46 72.80 71.66 81.13 74.50 65.25 54.41 90.56 67.65 57.44 61.50 50.77 57.25 77.51 74.47 79.01 76.74 
2006 74.71 58.92 87.94 72.12 74.59 70.24 82.51 74.97 61.46 55.88 91.61 67.10 58.45 66.47 71.75 64.90 78.78 74.49 80.37 77.56 
2007 82.23 61.13 88.55 75.86 75.80 70.76 85.29 76.33 71.96 56.76 92.89 71.58 61.22 66.14 72.30 65.93 82.52 75.04 82.34 79.64 
2008 78.67 61.51 90.14 75.12 74.23 70.47 86.48 75.95 69.91 57.84 92.89 71.24 62.27 66.10 71.86 66.18 82.46 75.06 83.35 79.87 
Source: ETH KOF Index of Globalization, Zurich. 
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Appendix 5  
 
a) Political stability 
BG_Stab HR_Stab RO_Stab SE_Stab SI_Stab 
61,32 54,38 52,16 13,50 69,90 
60,50 56,44 50,46 16,00 68,46 
59,70 58,04 54,70 25,10 70,86 
59,98 59,64 58,94 34,20 73,26 
56,16 58,60 58,04 34,00 72,34 
53,32 60,16 53,42 32,80 69,74 
54,80 58,26 54,48 32,60 69,78 
59,26 60,64 54,92 36,80 70,72 
58,58 62,10 55,82 37,20 70,96 
58,62 61,48 55,26 38,60 71,68 
 
b) Control corruption index (KKM) (transformed) 
 
BG_KKM HR_KKM RO_KKM SE_KKM SI_KKM 
46,90 46,80 44,00 27,70 71,04 
47,80 51,24 45,00 27,60 68,18 
48,20 53,42 44,10 30,50 67,68 
48,60 55,58 43,20 33,40 67,16 
50,34 52,60 44,80 40,20 69,26 
54,98 54,88 47,00 41,40 73,34 
52,30 54,80 46,80 42,20 69,50 
46,60 52,38 48,20 44,20 71,04 
47,60 52,72 48,00 43,60 70,48 
46,00 51,46 49,40 45,40 68,92 
















Figure 1. Models of nonlinear regression statistical relationships between political stability and corruption 
 
Appendix 6 
    Figure 1a: Bulgaria             Figure 1b: Croatia                 Figure 1c: Romania
                                     Figure 1d: Serbia                      Figure 1e: Slovenia
